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RUNNING HEAD: Social Comparison and Overconfidence 
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Abstract 
A common social comparison bias—the better-than-average-effect—is frequently described as 
psychologically equivalent to the individual judgment bias known as overconfidence. However, 
research has found “hard-easy” effects for each bias that yield a seemingly paradoxical reversal: 
Hard tasks tend to produce overconfidence but worse-than-average perceptions, whereas easy 
tasks tend to produce underconfidence and better-than-average effects. We argue that the two 
biases are in fact positively related because they share a common psychological basis in 
subjective feelings of competence, but that the “hard-easy” reversal is both empirically possible 
and logically necessary under specifiable conditions. Two studies are presented to support these 
arguments. We find little support for personality differences in these biases, and conclude that 
domain-specific feelings of competence account best for their relationship to each other.     
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Social Comparison and Confidence: 
When Thinking You’re Better than Average Predicts Overconfidence 
 How do people evaluate their own abilities? This was one of the basic questions 
underlying Festinger’s original formulation of social comparison theory. Festinger (1954) 
proposed that people have a fundamental desire to evaluate their abilities, but often cannot test 
them against an objective standard. Therefore the abilities of others become the subjective reality 
that people use to reduce this uncertainty. Festinger largely portrayed this as a “cold” process 
(Goethals, Messick, & Allison, 1991), although with the recognition that there is a 
“unidirectional drive upward” in evaluations: People prefer to be better than others on a given 
ability, not worse.  
A “hotter” version of social comparison theory emerged in the 1980s and 1990s that 
emphasized the importance of “downward comparisons” (Hakmiller, 1966; Wills, 1981) as a 
source of self-enhancement and positive affect (Alicke, 1985; Goethals, Messick, & Allison, 
1991; Taylor, 1989; Taylor, Wayment, & Collins, 1993). Theories of downward comparison 
proposed that people seek and recall social comparison information favorable to themselves in 
order to hold the view that they are superior to others. Perhaps the most famous example of 
downward comparison is the “better than average” (BTA) effect (Goethals et al., 1991; Taylor & 
Brown, 1988), demonstrated in an early study which found that 90% of drivers believed that they 
were above average in driving ability (Svenson, 1981). Hundreds of studies have since replicated 
this pattern across a wide range of ability domains (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; 
Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). 
 In the early 1990s, Goethals et al. (1991) observed that an important question not directly 
raised by Festinger (1954) was, “How well do people evaluate their own abilities?” They 
proposed that many social comparison evaluations are prone to systematic biases. For example, 
the BTA effect is typically interpreted as a bias because of the statistical unlikelihood that a 
majority of people would be above average. More careful studies have elicited a percentile 
estimate on an ability domain within a well-defined population. These studies have found that 
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more than fifty percent of a population believes it is above the 50th percentile within that 
population, which is a statistical impossibility (e.g., Klar & Giladi, 1997).  
 The question “how well do people evaluate their abilities?” has also received attention 
from researchers in cognitive psychology in work on overconfidence. Decades of research have 
compared measures of subjective confidence with objective performance on a variety of tasks 
(e.g., Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Yates, 
1990). In one common paradigm, participants are given general knowledge questions with two 
possible answers. They are then asked to choose the answer they think is correct and to estimate 
the probability that they are right. Over many judgments, the average probability given can be 
compared to the actual proportion of choices that are correct. If people are insightful about their 
ability on these knowledge questions, we would expect that their expressed confidence would 
match the rate at which they answered questions correctly. A gap between average confidence 
and proportion correct indicates a lack of insight about ability. And, indeed, such a gap often 
occurs. Many of the original studies found that people were overconfident (OC): Average 
confidence exceeded average proportion correct.  
 Thus, the question, “how well do people evaluate their abilities?” has received similar 
answers in these two literatures: People systematically overestimate their abilities. And many 
researchers have noted this similarity. The better-than-average effect and overconfidence are 
frequently described as related—even identical—phenomena (e.g., Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hoelzl & Rustichini, 2005; Juslin, Winman, & 
Olsson, 2000; Moore, Kurtzberg, Fox, & Bazerman, 1999). For example, one popular book on 
behavioral economics uses one phenomenon to illustrate the other: “[O]verconfidence often 
appears in the form of unrealistically high appraisals of one’s own qualities versus those of 
others. The classic example of this tendency is a 1981 survey of automobile drivers in Sweden, 
in which 90% of them described themselves as above average drivers.” (Belsky & Gilovich, 
1999, p. 153-154 ). Intuitively, the connection between BTA and OC is appealing, and 
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nonacademics also readily endorse the relationship between them (Yates, Lee, & Shinotsuka, 
1996).  
 But is there, in fact, a direct relationship between the two biases? If one knew, for 
example, that Ann thought she was in the 80th percentile of performance on a geography quiz 
and Bill thought he was in the 50th percentile, would one be able to predict that Ann is more 
overconfident than Bill if she was asked to give a confidence level for the individual answers? 
Similarly, if one learned that sports quizzes elicit higher percentile estimates on average than do 
geography quizzes, would one be able to predict that sports quizzes elicit more overconfidence 
than do geography quizzes? Surprisingly, these direct questions about the relationship between 
BTA and OC have not been tested empirically.  
 The apparent similarity of BTA and OC has been cast in doubt in recent years when 
“hard-easy” manipulations in each literature were discovered to have opposite effects on the two 
biases. In the overconfidence literature, people have been found to be overconfident on “hard” 
questions but underconfident on “easy” questions (Brenner, 2003; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 
1977), where hard and easy are defined in terms of actual performance. For example, if general 
knowledge questions are sorted based on the proportion of respondents who answered them 
correctly, then those questions that are frequently answered incorrectly will show overconfidence 
and those that are frequently answered correctly will show underconfidence. In contrast, 
researchers in the BTA tradition have found that “easy” tasks produce the BTA effect, and that 
“hard” tasks actually produce a worse than average (WTA) effect (Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 
in press; Kruger, 1999; Moore & Kim, 2003). Thus, hard tasks appear to produce greater 
overconfidence but weaker BTA effects, whereas easy tasks produce less overconfidence but 
stronger BTA effects. If BTA and OC are related (even identical) phenomena, why does varying 
task difficulty have opposite effects on each bias? Is it a real reversal that is replicable within the 
same study, or is it an illusion created by looking across studies and methods? And, if it is real, 
why does it occur?  
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 The studies presented in this paper explore the relationship between BTA effects and OC 
to identify their similarities and differences. We propose that BTA and OC are in fact 
fundamentally related, and therefore the common academic practice of linking them together is 
justified. The key factor uniting them is that a subjective sense of competence in a domain leads 
various subjective measures of ability in that domain to be highly correlated with each other (but 
only poorly correlated with objective measures of ability). We also propose that hard-easy 
manipulations do in fact have opposite effects on the two biases, and that this reversal does not 
represent a paradox—in fact, it is necessary under specifiable circumstances. We will show that 
changes in task difficulty can affect actual performance more than confidence. In addition, 
changes in task difficulty can inflate perceived percentile. When both occur, there must be a 
negative relationship between BTA and OC. In the next section, we provide a systematic analysis 
of the relationship between BTA and OC using a standard BTA measure (perceived percentile) 
and a standard overconfidence measure (the difference between average confidence and average 
proportion correct, which is sometimes called calibration-in-the-large (Yates, 1990)).   
 The relationship between BTA and OC. One of the fundamental results in both the BTA 
and OC literatures is that subjective perceptions are poorly correlated with objective measures 
(see Alba & Hutchinson, 2000, and Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003, for recent reviews). An early 
and classic demonstration of this pattern was found by Oskamp (1965) who showed that forecast 
accuracy was poorly correlated with confidence. The weak relationship has now been found in 
many studies. We discuss the significance of this weak relationship first in the context of 
overconfidence. The poor correlation between objective and subjective measures leads to 
predictable patterns of bias depending on how data are conditioned (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 
1994; Soll, 1996). Figure 1 shows a stylized pattern of results from the literature on 
overconfidence. It depicts a weak linear relationship between confidence and proportion correct 
across a set of judgments, and plots the same relationship in two ways (Erev et al., 1994). The 
top panel shows the classic pattern of overconfidence: When average proportion correct is 
plotted on levels of confidence, there is a region of underconfidence on the lefthand side of the 
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diagram, in which proportion correct falls above the identity line, and a region of overconfidence 
on the righthand side, in which proportion correct falls below the identity line. A typical result is 
that when people say they are 90% confident about their performance, they are correct only 70% 
of the time.  
 The bottom panel plots average confidence on proportion correct, once again showing the 
weak relationship between the two variables. The lefthand side of the diagram depicts the “hard” 
region in which proportion correct is low and confidence exceeds the identity line. Thus, “hard” 
questions tend to produce overconfidence. The righthand side of the diagram depicts the “easy” 
region in which proportion correct is high and average confidence falls short of it. “Easy” 
questions tend to produce underconfidence. In recent years, many scholars have attributed the 
hard-easy effect observed when items are sorted based on proportion correct to mean reversion 
(Erev et al., 1994; Dawes & Mulford, 1996; Juslin, Winman, & Olsson, 2000; Klayman et al., 
1999).1 While mean reversion can and does contribute to the hard-easy effect in overconfidence, 
it is important to note that psychological factors may contribute to these effects as well (Ayton & 
McClelland, 1997; Griffin & Varey, 1996; Klayman et al., 1999).  
 More recently, the poor correlation between subjective and objective measures has been 
demonstrated in the BTA literature (Ackerman, Beier, & Bowen, 2002; Ames & Kammrath, 
2004; Burson et al., in press; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Krueger & Mueller, 2002; Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999). In these studies, actual percentile in a domain is measured by giving 
participants a test and then assigning them a percentile rank based on their proportion correct. 
This percentile rank is then compared to the participant’s percentile estimate within the 
population performing that task. Figure 2 depicts the resulting relationship when actual 
percentile is plotted on perceived percentile (top panel) and vice versa (bottom panel). It is worth 
noting a difference between percentile calibration and confidence calibration. Actual percentile 
in an ability domain must necessarily average to 50, as shown in the top panel, whereas 
proportion correct has no corresponding constraint in the overconfidence literature, and the line 
in the top panel of Figure 1 could have any elevation. (Because actual percentile is a 
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monotonically-increasing function of proportion correct, the line in the top panel of Figure 2 
would have a similar slope if proportion correct were the dependent variable.) 
 Although actual percentile in an ability domain must average to 50, perceived percentile 
can average to well above or well below 50. Kruger (1999) has shown that perceived percentile 
varies directly with perceptions of absolute performance in a domain. Tasks on which a 
population’s absolute performance is high tend to produce BTA effects, whereas tasks on which 
absolute performance is low tend to produce WTA effects (a pattern also demonstrated by 
Burson et al. (in press), Camerer and Lovallo (1999), and by Moore and Kim (2003)). The 
bottom panel of Figure 2 depicts the hard-easy effect for perceived percentile. Important to our 
argument is that several studies (Kruger, 1999; Moore & Kim, 2003) have manipulated 
perceived difficulty by varying actual difficulty, thereby changing the average proportion correct 
across conditions and mirroring how the “hard-easy” difference is operationalized in the 
overconfidence literature.2
 Figures 1 and 2 summarize the main findings from the separate literatures on 
overconfidence and better-than-average effects. We now consider how the two measures will be 
related to each other. In the following analysis we will consider degrees of BTA and OC, where 
perceived percentile can range from worse-than-average to better-than-average effects, and 
calibration can range from underconfidence to overconfidence. Thus, if BTA and OC are 
positively correlated it simply means that as one increases in magnitude the other increases in 
magnitude, regardless of absolute magnitude.  
 Although objective and subjective measures are poorly correlated, we expect that related 
subjective measures will tend to be highly correlated. When individuals estimate their confidence 
in a performance and their percentile on a performance, they will tend to draw on similar 
evidence in assessing both:  Memory of the recent performance, views of the self in that domain, 
and general feelings about the self. We therefore predict that confidence will be strongly related 
to perceived percentile, as depicted in the top panel of Figure 3. However, because proportion 
correct will be weakly related to perceived percentile, overconfidence will increase with 
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perceived percentile. The difference between confidence and proportion correct is calculated in 
the bottom panel of Figure 3, and shows that as perceived percentile increases a region of 
diminishing underconfidence gives way to a region of increasing overconfidence.  
 Our basic prediction is that perceived percentile is positively related to greater degrees of 
overconfidence. Thus, we would expect that the answer to the earlier question, “If one knew that 
Ann thought she was in the 80th percentile of performance on a geography quiz and Bill thought 
he was in the 40th percentile, would one be able to predict that Ann is more overconfident than 
Bill if she was asked to give a confidence level for the individual answers?” is yes. We believe 
that demonstrating this empirical relationship would provide initial justification for the common 
practice of linking these constructs. However, we also want to explore the basis of this 
relationship. Thus, in the studies that follow we examine whether the link arises because of 
general individual differences based in personality that influence all perceptions of competence, 
such as differences in self-esteem and narcissism, or whether the link is due to domain-specific 
self-views that affect only domain-related perceptions of competence (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 
2003).  
 If there is a positive relationship between perceived percentile and degree of 
overconfidence, and the analysis summarized in Figure 3 predicts that there will be one, why 
then does the positive relationship seem to reverse when task difficulty changes?  We close this 
section by dissecting the seeming paradox of this reversal. Figure 4 is a modified version of 
Figure 3. At no loss of generality, Figure 3 was drawn to depict a “hard” task in which 
proportion correct was low, on average, in a population. These two lines are repeated in the top 
panel of Figure 4. However, the top panel of Figure 4 adds a new line that plots the average 
proportion correct for an easy task (which by definition in this case has a higher average 
proportion correct). The effect of making a task easier on overconfidence is shown in the bottom 
panel of Figure 4 as a shift of the entire line to the bottom right:  The consequence is that the 
same level of perceived percentile will translate into less overconfidence.  
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 However, manipulating proportion correct on a task will affect not just average 
overconfidence, but also average perceived percentile (Kruger, 1999). Figure 5 completes the 
analysis by depicting both effects simultaneously. The top panel shows the effect of a hard-easy 
manipulation on perceived percentile (shown as two different positions on the x-axis) and on 
overconfidence (shown as mapping the two different positions into different linear functions with 
the same slope but different constants). Making the task easier increases perceived percentile 
while simultaneously reducing overconfidence. This pattern is depicted in the bottom panel of 
Figure 5 as a pair of points linked by a downward sloping solid line. 
There are two key features that lead the previously hypothesized positive relationship 
between BTA and OC (see Figure 5) to reverse in this situation. First, the difficulty manipulation 
affects perceived percentile: A task that leads to a high proportion correct leads to, on average, 
higher estimates of percentile. Second, the difficulty manipulation leads to a bigger change in 
proportion correct than in mean confidence. Thus, in moving from a hard task to an easy one, 
confidence increases but accuracy increases even more. Consequently, the OC associated with 
the hard task is attenuated with the easy task. The final result is that, compared to the hard task, 
the easy task yields higher BTA but lower OC. 
We note that this pattern is not inevitable. Some difficulty manipulations could change 
mean confidence more than proportion correct. In this case, the hard-easy manipulation would 
not reverse the relationship between BTA and OC. In fact, it would yield a more positive 
relationship between BTA and OC. We consider the boundary conditions for the reversal at 
greater length in the Discussion and in a model in Appendix B. We simply note that our studies 
were designed to facilitate the reversal and thereby provide useful confirmation that the reversal 
is logically and empirically possible. However, we caution that this reversal need not hold across 
all “difficulty” manipulations. 
We close this analysis with a brief consideration of an alternative operationalization of 
BTA. In the previous arguments, we have asked how perceived percentile is related to 
overconfidence. Perceived percentile is simply a subjective measure that, at the individual level, 
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does not constitute a bias (one might actually be above average in an ability!). A bias can only be 
attributed at a population level when mean perceived percentile differs significantly from 50. In 
contrast, overconfidence is an individual level bias. A natural question is whether both biases 
could be calculated at the individual level and their relationship explored? For example, a 
measure of “overplacement” could be constructed by subtracting actual percentile from 
perceived percentile for each individual. This measure could then be correlated with 
overconfidence. However, the interpretation of the resulting relationship is problematic. 
Specifically, if the objective measures used in calculating overconfidence (i.e., proportion 
correct) and overplacement (i.e., actual percentile) are derived from the same performance, they 
will be monotonically-increasing functions of each other, and therefore highly correlated for 
purely mathematical reasons. Because the same term appears on both sides of the correlation 
between overconfidence and overplacement, they will be positively correlated for an artifactual 
reason (a more extended analysis is offered as part of the model presented in Appendix B).  
The artifactual relationship between overplacement and overconfidence leads us to 
downplay exploring this relationship. In recent years, however, researchers have proposed ways 
around this artifact within the OC (Juslin et al., 2000; Klayman et al., 1999) and BTA (Krueger 
& Mueller, 2002) literatures, which is to measure both subjective and objective variables on 
different performances. Such “split-sample” methods remove the biasing effects of a shared 
term. At several points in the paper we test the overplacement-overconfidence relationship when 
we can use a split-sample method.  
We note that the relationship between perceived percentile and overconfidence is not 
subject to the artifactual concern that plagues the overplacement-overconfidence relationship—
that is, the same measure does not appear twice in the variables that are being correlated. It is an 
empirical question how strongly correlated perceived percentile, confidence, and proportion 
correct are with each other. Although we hypothesize that the two subjective measures will be 
more highly correlated than either subjective measure is with proportion correct, this hypothesis 
is capable of empirical falsification. These statistical considerations are one reason we focus our 
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analysis on the relationship between perceived percentile and overconfidence. A second reason is 
that most social psychological studies of BTA effects do not assess objective ability at an 
individual level and do not measure overplacement (a tendency that has changed in recent 
years—see Footnote 2). Thus, our basic unit of analysis parallels that used in most social 
psychological studies of BTA effects, allowing for a more direct comparison between literatures.    
 The following studies were designed to test the hypothesized relationships between BTA 
and OC. Both studies used the same basic methodology. Participants were given a series of 10 
questions within a specific domain and asked to give their best estimate for each question. For 
example, one domain was the year in which Nobel Prizes in literature were awarded to different 
authors. Answers were correct if they deviated from the truth by less than a fixed value 
designated by the experimenters (e.g., within 5 years of the truth). A set of 10 difficult and 10 
easy questions was created within each domain simply by varying the stringency of the criterion 
for being correct (e.g., being within 5 years of the truth versus 30 years of the truth). After 
making an estimate on a question, participants estimated the probability that their answer was 
within the criterion. Their average confidence with a set of 10 items was then compared to the 
proportion correct in order to measure under-/overconfidence. Finally, participants estimated 
their percentile of performance for each set of 10 items. These constituted our two main 
measures in the following analyses.   
Method  
Participants 
 Study 1. Forty University of Chicago students were recruited with posted advertisements 
and were paid nine dollars for this 45-minute experiment. 
 Study 2. Thirty-five University of Michigan students were recruited from their 
introductory marketing class and received course credit for this 45-minute experiment. 
Materials 
In both studies, participants saw questions from five different domains. Each domain 
consisted of two subsets of 10 questions. These questions were drawn at random from a larger 
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list of items that were representatively sampled for a domain. Each 10-question subset was 
presented in either a difficult or an easy version. However, the order of the 100 estimates was the 
same across participants, consisting of 10 questions from each of the five domains, followed by 
another 10 questions from each of the five domains. The order of difficulty was counterbalanced 
such that half the participants received the first five subsets of questions in the difficult version 
and the second five in the easier version. For the other half, the first five subsets were in the 
easier version and the second five in the difficult version. 
Study 1 domains. Study 1 used five domains: college acceptance rates, dates of Nobel 
prizes, length of time pop songs had been on the charts, financial worth of richest people, and 
games won by hockey teams. The questions in these domains were selected randomly from the 
available information sources. Sample questions are provided in the appendix.  
Study 2 domains. Study 2 employed a different set of five domains: University of 
Michigan student demographics, distances between campus landmarks, University of Michigan 
football scores, characteristics of marketing students, and local pizza delivery costs. Sample 
questions are provided in the appendix. 
Procedure 
In both studies, participants were told that they would be making a series of estimates 
about a range of topics. They were given a booklet containing 10 subsets of 10 estimates. The 
introduction of the booklet provided an example of the overall procedure using questions from an 
unrelated domain. In the next part of the booklet, participants read 10 pages, each devoted to a 
different subset of questions. For each subset of 10 questions, participants read an explanation of 
the required estimates, the criterion for being correct, and information about the mean of the 
sample and the range in which 90% of the sample fell. They then made an estimate for each 
question and provided confidence in the accuracy of that estimate. Finally, at the end of each 
subset, participants also indicated their predicted percentile standing.  
After completing this section, participants in both studies answered questions about their 
mood and personality on the Self Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), Need for Closure (Webster & 
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Kruglanski, 1994), and Need for Cognition scales (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Participants 
in Study 1 also completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule measure (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988)) and Need for Uniqueness (Snyder & Fromkin, 1977) scales. Participants in 
Study 2 also completed the Defensive Pessimism Scale (Norem & Cantor, 1986), Hypersensitive 
Narcissism Scale (Hendin & Cheek, 1997), and Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & 
Terry, 1988). 
Results 
 Our first analysis explores the relationship between perceived percentile, average 
confidence, proportion correct, and overconfidence. Our unit of analysis is each set of 10 
questions for each person, yielding 400 data points for Study 1 and 350 data points for Study 2. 
Figures 6 (Study 1) and 7 (Study 2) show the scatter plot and regression equations when average 
confidence, proportion correct, and their difference is plotted against perceived percentile. As 
expected, average confidence was strongly related to perceived percentile but proportion correct 
was only weakly related. Consequently, perceived percentile predicted degree of overconfidence.  
 Tables 1 and 2 extend this analysis by including additional variables. Equation 2 in each 
table adds a dummy variable for the difficulty manipulation (where 1 = hard criterion). As 
expected, more difficult domains significantly increase overconfidence. Including the difficulty 
manipulation increases the coefficient for perceived percentile, indicating that the difficulty 
manipulation, when uncontrolled, acts a suppressor variable on the relationship. Finally, 
additional dummy variables were added for domain and participant (omitting one domain and 
one participant in each analysis). These “fixed effects” tests control for variation attributable to 
domains and individuals. It may be seen that the basic relationship between perceived percentile 
and overconfidence remains unaffected. In both studies, a one point increase in perceived 
percentile translates into a .4 increase in overconfidence after controlling for domain differences 
and individual differences. 
 A second way to examine the relationship between perceived percentile and 
overconfidence is to examine means at the level of domain. The top panel of Figure 8 plots 
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average overconfidence and average perceived percentile for the 10 domains in Studies 1 and 2. 
The relationship between the variables across domains is positive and strong (R-squared = .710, 
F(1, 9) = 23.04, p = .001). These analyses indicate that a one point increase in average perceived 
percentile in a domain translates into a 1.33 increase in overconfidence. Because this analysis is 
conducted at the level of a domain, average perceived percentiles that deviate from 50 can 
regarded as an under- or overplacement bias. This level of analysis indicates a strong positive 
relationship between overplacement and overconfidence. 
 To examine the hard-easy reversal, we analyzed perceived percentile and overconfidence 
separately in a repeated-measures ANOVA, with difficulty and domain as within-participant 
variables. The means for this analysis are presented in the first two columns of Tables 3 (Study 
1) and 4 (Study 2). In Study 1, there was a significant main effect of domain (F(4, 152) = 9.25, p 
< .001) and of difficulty (F(1, 38) = 19.31, p < .001) on perceived percentile; a marginal main 
effect of domain (F(4, 152) = 2.33, p = .059) and a main effect of difficulty (F(1, 38) = 666.12, p 
< .001 on overconfidence; and an interaction of domain and difficulty for on overconfidence 
(F(4, 152) = 28.42, p < .001). In Study 2, there was a significant main effect of domain (F(4, 
128) = 3.17, p = .016) and of difficulty (F(1, 32) = 13.26, p = .001) on perceived percentile; a 
significant main effect of domain (F(4, 132) = 11.29, p < .001) and of difficulty (F(1, 33) = 
69.38, p = .001 on overconfidence; and no interactions (F < 1). As the overall means in each 
study show, the difficulty manipulation significantly increased the degree of overconfidence 
while significantly decreasing perceived percentile. 
 Tables 3 and 4 also provide the means for confidence and proportion correct for each 
domain, which were analyzed in repeated-measures ANOVA, with difficulty and domain as 
within-participant variables. In both studies, there were significant main effects of difficulty and 
domain on proportion correct and on confidence (ps < .001), as well as a significant difficulty by 
domain interaction (ps < .05), indicating that the difficulty effect was stronger in some domains. 
As expected, the easy conditions produced more confidence and higher proportion correct than 
did hard conditions. The means in Tables 3 and 4 make clear the important underlying cause of 
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the hard-easy reversal: The difficulty manipulation produced a difference in confidence across 
conditions, but an even larger difference on proportion correct. As we note in the Discussion—
and analyze at greater length in Appendix—it is this pattern that drives the hard-easy reversal 
across BTA and OC. 
 This difficulty-induced reversal is depicted graphically in the bottom panel of Figure 8. 
The top panel shows the generally strong, positive relationship between perceived percentile and 
overconfidence. The bottom panel plots the means for overconfidence and perceived percentile 
within the hard and easy versions of the 10 domains used in Studies 1 and 2. The means for the 
hard version of a domain are linked to the means for the easy version of the same domain with a 
solid line. This graph reveals that the strong, positive relationship in the top panel masks a 
second relationship: Within a domain, there is a pronounced inverse relationship between 
perceived percentile and overconfidence, consistent with the pattern anticipated in Figure 5. This 
pattern held for 10 out of 10 domains depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 8 (also in the means 
in Tables 3 and 4).  
Overall, we find that perceived percentile is strongly related to overconfidence. The 
initial analyses (Figures 6 and 7) demonstrate that it is the strong relationship between perceived 
percentile and confidence that drives this relationship. As expected, however, the positive 
relationship can be reversed when difficulty is manipulated within a domain (bottom Figure 8).  
We conclude our analysis with an exploration of the factors that lead perceived percentile 
and overconfidence to be highly correlated. We explore three levels of explanation: General 
personality differences, domain-specific self-views, and item-specific influences. An individual-
level analysis is presented in Table 5 that allows us to assess the influence of personality 
differences. In this analysis, average perceived percentile and average overconfidence are first 
calculated for an individual across the 10 subdomains before performing any correlations. For 
example, a person might have average perceived percentiles across the 10 subdomains of 25, 35, 
40, 70, 50, 35, 70, 40, 55, 65, yielding an overall individual-level average of 48.5. The first line 
shows the high correlation between average perceived percentile and average overconfidence 
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when calculated at the individual level. However, the next section of the table shows that these 
individual level measures have only weak relationships with the personality measures. In Study 
1, there was some evidence that Need for Closure correlated with perceived percentile and 
overconfidence. However, this pattern did not replicate in Study 2. None of the other 
relationships was even suggestive. Because these personality measures were not correlated 
reliably with either perceived percentile or overconfidence, they do not represent a plausible 
explanation for the observed relationship between perceived percentile and overconfidence. 
These weak personality relationships are consistent with other research in this area. 
Jonsson and Alwood (2003) found no relationship between realistic confidence judgments and 
Need for Cognition. Ehrlinger and Dunning (2003) found no correlation between performance 
estimates and Self Esteem or PANAS. Interestingly, Ames and Damrath (2004) have found a 
correlation between narcissism and overconfidence in a social judgment task, but this was with a 
scale of their own design. We find no similar pattern when using more common narcissism 
scales on tasks that have less social content. Our conclusion is that standard personality measures 
do little to predict level of perceived percentile or degree of overconfidence.  
Table 6 continues an individual level analysis by examining overconfidence, 
overplacement, and their components. As in Table 5, each measure is calculated for an individual 
by averaging together his or her responses for the 10 subdomains. Practically, this level of 
analysis is akin to creating a quasi-personality scale by aggregating measures across several 
domains of knowledge to get a reliable measure of these tendencies. The results show that many 
of the basic relationships hold across individuals: Notably, average perceived percentile and 
average confidence are strongly correlated in both studies, and both are more strongly related 
than either subjective measure is to an objective measure. At this level of analysis, perceived 
percentile predicts overconfidence well in Study 1, but only weakly in Study 2. (We do not 
discuss all the relationships in Table 6 but provide them because researchers in different 
literatures may find different combinations of interest.)  
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We note that there is a very strong relationship between overplacement and 
overconfidence at this level of analysis. In the introduction, we suggested that the relationship 
between under-/overplacement and under-/overconfidence is interesting but problematic. It is 
interesting because it compares one measure of individual-level bias with another. However, for 
the reasons described in the introduction (and elaborated further in footnotes 1 and 2), the 
relationship is problematic if the same performance is used to calculate both actual percentile and 
proportion correct. The issue is that the same variable (slightly transformed) therefore appears in 
the estimates of both under-/overplacement and under-/overconfidence, thereby inducing a 
positive correlation between the measures. Not surprisingly, Table 6 shows that actual percentile 
and proportion correct are extremely highly correlated, which confirms that interpreting the high 
overplacement-overconfidence relationship is problematic. Thus, we conducted a split-samples 
analysis predicting overconfidence on easy subdomains from overplacement on hard subdomains 
(.339 in Study 1, .495 in Study 2), and vice versa (.475 in Study 1, .194 in Study 2).These 
individual level analyses suggest that, even after removing the artifactual bias in the 
overplacement-overconfidence relationship, there remains an average correlation of 
approximately .35 between the two measures. Overplacement is positively related to 
overconfidence. 
Table 7 presents a new type of analysis that examines the influence of domain-specific 
self-views (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Markus, 1977). The basic assumption underlying this 
test is that people hold views of themselves tied to specific ability domains—“I know a lot about 
literature,” “I’m not a hockey fan,” and so on. These domain-specific self-views lead perceived 
percentile and overconfidence to move together within a domain more strongly than between 
domains. The domain-specificity proposal implies that perceived percentile measured in one 
domain (e.g., literature) will correlate more strongly with overconfidence in the same domain 
than in another domain (e.g., hockey). However, given our measures, one reason there may be a 
high correlation between perceived percentile and overconfidence within a subdomain is that 
both judgments are based on reactions to the same items—“I’m below average and not very 
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confident about these particular literature questions, but I would be more knowledgeable about 
other literature questions.” Our data allow us to separate the influence of domain-specific self-
views from reactions to specific items by looking at the correlation within a domain but across 
difficulty and thereby question subsets. If these within-domain-and-across-difficulty correlations 
are higher than across-domain correlations, it indicates the influence of a domain-specific self-
view that exerts an influence across different instantiations of the same domain. 
For this analysis, we calculated four sets of correlations that compare the correlation 
between perceived percentile and overconfidence a) within a subdomain (i.e., within a domain 
and within difficulty using the same set of items), b) within a domain but across difficulty, c) 
across domains but within difficulty, and d) across domains and across difficulty. The average 
correlation is shown in Table 6, by study. Not surprisingly, the average correlation between 
perceived percentile and overconfidence within a subdomain is fairly high (this correlation 
analysis merely restates the regression results in Tables 1 and 2). The correlations calculated 
within domain but across difficulty are not significantly smaller than the within subdomain 
correlations (ns), but are significantly larger than the across-domain correlations (ps < .01).3 We 
believe this shows that domain-specific self-views do exert an influence across separate 
measures drawn from the same domain. Thus, one can predict overconfidence from perceived 
percentile better when the measures come from the same domain than when they come from 
different domains. Finally, the fact that across-domain correlations are positive—and in Study 1 
averaged above .20—does suggest a general individual difference that underlies perceived 
percentile and overconfidence. 
Our final analysis is of under-/overplacement, which is calculated here as perceived 
percentile minus actual percentile within a subdomain. The analysis in Table 8 presents the same 
grouping of correlations as in Table 7, except it replaces perceived percentile with 
overplacement. Table 8 shows that within-subdomain correlations are quite high, and higher than 
the comparable correlations in Table 7. This pattern is expected because the correlations are 
inflated by the inclusion of a common variable. The second row of Table 8 is revealing because 
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it provides within-domain correlations that have no common variable problem. The within-
domain-across-difficulty correlations are, not surprisingly, lower than the within-subdomain 
correlations (ps < .01). They are also higher than the across-domain correlations, marginally in 
Study 1 (p = .15) and significantly in Study 2 (p = .02 in Study 2), indicating that domain-
specificity provides a modest enhancement of the overplacement-overconfidence relationship 
when analyzed at the domain level.  
Discussion 
 These analyses show that better-than-average effects and overconfidence are 
fundamentally related to each other, yet their relationship can be reversed. Overall, there is a 
positive relationship between overconfidence and better-than-average effects. This relationship 
holds across individuals and across domains. Thus, the answer to the question, “If one knew that 
Ann thought she was in the 80th percentile of performance on a geography quiz and Bill thought 
he was in the 50th percentile, would one be able to predict that Ann is more overconfident than 
Bill if she was asked to give a confidence level for the individual answers?” is yes. Similarly, 
knowing that one domain produces a higher average perceived percentile than another allows 
one to predict it will produce higher average overconfidence. The positive relationship justifies 
the common academic practice of treating each tendency as related to the other.  
 The positive relationship between BTA and OC arises because subjective assessments of 
confidence and percentile estimates are highly correlated with each, but each is poorly correlated 
with actual performance. Several split-sample tests indicate that overplacement—measured as 
the difference between actual and perceived percentile at the individual level—predicts 
overconfidence We find some evidence that these relationships are stronger within domains, 
indicating that domain-specific self-views help drive the relationship. By comparison, we find 
little evidence that personality measures help explain the relationship between percentile 
estimates and overconfidence.  
 A seemingly paradoxical reversal of hard-easy effects for the better-than-average effect 
and overconfidence has been observed across different studies. Hard tasks appear to produce 
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worse-than-average effects but overconfidence; easy tasks appear to produce better-than-average 
effects but underconfidence. Our results show that this apparent reversal is a real one—it is 
empirically possible. Moreover, it is not a paradox. It is possible to specify the conditions that 
drive it. In our studies, a difficulty manipulation within a domain produced larger changes in 
average proportion correct than in average confidence. The same manipulation tended to change 
perceived percentiles systematically: Hard tasks yielded lower perceived percentiles on average 
than did easy tasks (Kruger, 1999). Thus, increased task difficulty within a domain tended to 
decrease the BTA effect while increasing OC. This reversal, however, will not always occur. 
Some difficulty manipulations will in fact strengthen the positive relationship between BTA and 
OC. The next section provides an intuitive sketch of the conditions that moderate whether the 
BTA-OC relationship is positive or negative.  
 Conditions for the “hard-easy” reversal. The relationship between BTA and OC can be 
clarified by comparing three different analyses. One analysis compares participants responding 
to the same topic and difficulty level. For convenience, participants can be thought of as being 
two types based on a median split of percentile estimates. Because subjective measures are 
highly correlated, those who estimate high percentiles will tend to be the most confident, and 
also the most overconfident (because accuracy is imperfectly correlated with the subjective 
measures). This type of analysis is depicted in Figures 3 and 4. A second analysis compares 
participants responding to different topics and the same difficulty level. Across topics, subjective 
measures are highly correlated with each other and weakly correlated with accuracy. Thus the 
topics with the greatest percentile estimates (and hence also the greatest BTA) will tend to also 
exhibit high confidence, accuracy will be regressive, and consequently the high BTA topics will 
tend to be the same ones as those that exhibit the most OC (e.g., see the top panel of Figure 8). In 
both of these analyses, BTA and OC are positively correlated.  
 Finally, consider a third analysis in which different levels of difficulty are compared for 
the same topic domain. The easier version consistently has both higher percentile estimates and 
higher accuracy than does the harder version. However, the easy version may or may not 
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produce greater overconfidence. This depends on whether mean confidence changes more or less 
than mean accuracy across the difficulty manipulation. In our studies, mean confidence was 
consistently higher in the easy version than in the hard version, but the change in mean 
confidence was less than the change in mean accuracy. Consequently, the easy version yielded 
greater BTA but less OC than did the hard version of a domain. Thus, in these circumstances, 
BTA and OC are negatively correlated. However, difficulty manipulations that affect mean 
confidence more than mean accuracy would not produce a negative correlation. These conditions 
are considered at greater length in Appendix B. The next section proposes difficulty 
manipulations that would yield a positive relationship between BTA and OC.  
 Undoing the “hard-easy” reversal. Recent research in the BTA literature has 
manipulated task difficulty in a way that manipulates both perceptions of performance and actual 
task performance (Burson et al., in press; Kruger, 1999; Moore & Kim, 2003; Windschitl et al, 
2003). This was of interest in the BTA literature because mean changes in actual task 
performance at the population level is irrelevant to judgments of perceived percentile—mean 
percentile in a population is always 50 regardless of the level of absolute performance in the 
population. For these types of manipulations, average performance (e.g., proportion correct) 
tends to change more than average perceptions (e.g., confidence), yielding the reversal 
documented here. However, other difficulty manipulations could change perceptions more than 
performance. If tasks were designed to influence perceptions of performance more than actual 
performance, the hard-easy reversal would not occur. We offer one example and sketch two 
other possibilities. 
 In his classic study on the relationship between confidence and accuracy, Oskamp (1965) 
manipulated the amount of information people had available on which to base forecasts. He 
found that confidence increased with the number of cues available. However, accuracy of the 
forecasts did not (that is, the cues were not particularly diagnostic). We believe that Oskamp’s 
paradigm could be used to manipulate feelings of difficulty without actually changing 
performance. Providing increasing amounts of information would tend to inflate both confidence 
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and perceived percentile without actually improving performance (especially if the information 
is not diagnostic). This difficulty manipulation, unlike the current studies, would reinforce the 
underlying positive relationship between BTA and OC. 
Several other paradigms suggest that perceptions of ability can be influenced without 
influencing actual performance. For example, Fox and colleagues have shown that the sequence 
of tasks can affect perceptions of ability (Fox & Tversky, 1995; Fox & Weber, 2002). When 
participants confront a comparatively difficult task before a target task, they increase their sense 
of competence on the target task; a comparatively easy task has the opposite effect. Of course, 
actual performance did not change on the target task. Schwarz and his colleagues (e.g., Schwarz, 
Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991) have shown that asking for 10 
reasons why something is true versus 2 reasons made the retrieval of reasons either difficult or 
easy, respectively. A similar manipulation applied to judgments about the self could affect 
perceived competence without changing performance on a related task. Both paradigms suggest 
ways in which future studies might manipulate perceptions of difficulty independently of actual 
difficulty and thus eliminate hard-easy reversals. 
Conclusion 
 Social comparison theory was one of the first psychological theories to consider how 
people evaluate their own abilities, which ultimately led to the question of how well they did it 
(Goethals et al., 1991). Pervasive better-than-average effects and judgmental overconfidence 
suggest that people are biased in these ability assessments. The current results confirm that these 
two judgments of ability are closely related. Individuals who believe they are better than average 
are also more likely to be overconfident. And domains that produce better-than-average effects 
also produce greater overconfidence. Across many ways of analyzing the relationship between 
percentile judgments and overconfidence, the following relationship hold within a knowledge 
domain: The higher one’s assessment of ability relative to others, the more likely one is to be 
overconfident when making judgments related to that domain. This robust relationship justifies 
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the common practice of treating better-than-average effects and overconfidence as closely related 
phenomena. 
 These two assessments of ability, however, need not always show a positive relationship. 
Task difficulty can lead the two assessments to have a negative relationship: Higher assessments 
of ability relative to others will be accompanied by less overconfidence. This effect of task 
difficulty is both empirically demonstrable and logically explained. However, it will occur under 
only limited but specifiable circumstances. We hope that research on social comparison and on 
decision making will benefit from understanding when better-than-average effects and 
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Footnotes 
1 The hard-easy effect in overconfidence is inevitable for some methods of sorting questions into 
hard and easy categories (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Juslin et al., 2000; 
Klayman et al., 1999). Part of the problem is that the independent variable (accuracy) and 
dependent variable (overconfidence  = confidence – accuracy) are bound to be correlated 
because the same measure of accuracy shows up in both halves of the equation. Error in the 
accuracy measure guarantees the effect (see Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin et al., 2000; Klayman 
et al., 1999). Some versions of the hard-easy effect hold up to statistical control. For example, 
individuals who are less accurate on one set of questions (i.e., the questions are hard for them) 
are more overconfident on a different set of questions on the same topic (Klayman et al., 1999). 
2It is worth noting that the “hard-easy” effect depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 2 differs 
from that traditionally discussed in the overconfidence literature because average proportion 
correct is manipulated for a whole population in an ability domain. Thus, the hard-easy effect on 
percentiles is manifested as an increase in perceived percentile (i.e., the line in the bottom panel 
of Figure 2 shifts upward). Kruger and Dunning (1999) conducted an analysis of percentile 
estimates that more directly parallels the original hard-easy analysis in the overconfidence 
literature (see Footnote 1) when they sorted participants based on their actual percentile and 
examined their percentile estimates. They found that the worst performers (as measured by actual 
percentile) overestimated their percentile, whereas the best performers underestimated theirs. In 
a direct parallel to the overconfidence literature, this pattern has been reinterpreted as a necessary 
effect of regression (Ackerman et al., 2002; Burson et al., in press; Krueger & Mueller, 2002). 
3 Mean differences in the correlations were tested after performing an r-to-z transformation on 
the individual correlations, taking an average, and then performing a set of planned, non-
orthogonal contrasts (df = 96) on the means of the transformed correlations. The contrasts 
compared Row 1 vs. Row 2, and Row 2 vs. Rows 3 and 4. 
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Appendix A: Stimuli 
University of Chicago Quizzes (harder criteria in brackets) 
 
1 Rice University %
2 University of Michigan--Ann Arbor %
3 New York University %
4 Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. %
5 University of Washington %
6 Boston College %
7 Vanerbilt University %
8 University of Rochester %
9 University of California--Irvine %
10 Duke University %
11 Cornell University %
12 Wake Forest University %
13 Pennsylvania State University (Penn State) %
14 University of Wisconsin, Madison %
15 Georgetown University %
16 University of California, Berkeley %
17 %
18 Johns Hopkins University %
19 Dartmouth College %
20 %California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology      
(MIT)
College Acceptance
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within 20% [5%] of 
being correct?
In this section, you will estimate the acceptance rate of colleges.  The acceptance rate is the rate of 
acceptance to applications. Therefore, if a college lets in only half of the people who apply, it would 
have a 50% acceptance rate. You should try to be accurate within 20% [5%] of the truth. These 10 
colleges were selected randomly from the top 51 colleges of 2001 published by US News and World 
Report. Within the 20 colleges in this packet, the average acceptance rate is 44% and 90% of the 
colleges fall between 19% and 77%.
What is the acceptance rate (%) of this college?
 
 
Social Comparison and Confidence 34 
1 Claude Simon %
2 Wladyslaw Stanislaw Remont %
3 Thomas Stearns Eliot %
4 Patrick White %
5 Pablo Neruda %
6 Romain Rolland %
7 Johannes Vilhelm Jensen %
8 Anatole Fronce %
9 Sinclair Lewis %
10 William Faulkner %
11 Ivo Andric %
12 Frans Eemil Sillanpaa %
13 Elias Canetti %
14 Albert Camus %
15 William Butler Yeats %
16 Juan Ramon Jimenez %
17 Pearl Buck (pen name Pearl Walsh) %
18 Hermann Hesse %
19 Singrid Undset %
20 Kenzaburo Oe %
Nobel Prizes
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within 30 [5] years 
of being correct?
In this section, you will estimate the year in which particular people received the Nobel Prize in 
Literature. You should try to be accurate within 30 [5] years of the truth. These 10 Nobel Laureates 
were selected randomly from the 100 Nobel Laureates in Literature. Within the 20 Laureates in this 
packet, the average year of the Nobel Prize is 1949 and 90% of the Laureates fall between 1921 and 
1985.
What year did this person receive the Nobel Prize?
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1 "Jaded", Aerosmith %
2 "Butterfly", Crazy Town %
3 "Survivor", Destiny's Child %
4 "Don't Tell Me", Madonna %
5 "Hanging By a Moment", Lifehouse %
6 "Promise", Jagged Edge %
7 %
8 "It's Over Now", 112 %
9 "Get Over Yourself", Eden's Crush %
10 "I Hope You Dance", Lee Ann Womack %
11 "All For You", Janet %
12 "Angel", Shaggy Featuring Rayvon %
13 "Stutter", Joe Featuring Mystikal %
14 "South Side", Moby Featuring Gwen Stefani %
15 "Love Don't Cost a Thing", Jennifer Lopez %
16 "Again", Lenny Kravitz %
17 %
18 "Thank You", Dido %
19 "Crazy", K-Ci & JoJo %
20 "If You're Gone", matchbox twenty %
"Nobody Wants To Be Lonely" Rick Martin 
With Christina Aguilera
"Put It On Me", Ja Rule Featuring Lil'Mo & 
Vita
Pop Songs
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within 7 weeks of 
being correct?
In this section, you will estimate the number of weeks that a particular single has been on the charts. 
You should try to be accurate within 7 weeks of the truth. These 10 hit singles were selected at 
random from the top 20 singles listed on the Billboard chart for March 31, 2001.  Within the 20 
singles in this packet, the average number of weeks is 14 and 90% of the singles fall between 3 and 
24 weeks.
How many weeks has this single been on the charts?
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1 John Werner Kluge (Metromedia) %
2 Lawrence Joseph Ellison (Oracle Corp.) %
3 Henry Samueli (Broadcom) %
4 Jeffrey P. Bezos (Amazon.com) %
5 James Goodnight (Software) %
6 S. Robson Walton (Wal-Mart stores) %
7 Paul Gardner Allen (Microsoft) %
8 Edward Crosby Johnson III (Fidelity) %
9 Daniel Smith (Fiber optics) %
10 Gururaj E. Deshpande (Fiber optics) %
11 Charles Ergen (Satellite Television) %
12 William H. Gates III (Microsoft Corp.) %
13 David Filo (Yahoo!) %
14 Craig O. McCaw (McCaw Cellular) %
15 Thomas J. Pritzker (Inheritance) %
16 Steven Ballmer (Microsoft) %
17 Theodore W. Waitt (Gateway 2000) %
18 Sumner M. Redstone (Viacom) %
19 Henry T. Nicholas (Broadcom) %
20 Sanjiv Sidhu (Software) %
Financial Worth
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within 10 [1] billion 
of being correct?
In this section, you will estimate the worth of the U.S.’s richest people. You should try to be 
accurate within $10 [$1] billion of the truth. These 10 people were selected at random from the top 
50 richest people in the U.S. as listed by Forbes for the year 2000. Within the 20 people in this 
packet, the average worth is $16 billion and 90% of the people fall between $5 and $58 billion.
What is the financial worth of this person—in billions?
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1 New Jersey Devils %
2 San Jose Sharks %
3 Washington Capitals %
4 Mighty Ducks of Anaheim %
5 Carolina Hurricanes %
6 Detroit Red Wings %
7 Pittsburgh Penguins %
8 Chicago Blackhawks %
9 Boston Bruins %
10 Edmonton Oilers %
11 St. Louis Blues %
12 Montreal Canadiens %
13 Minnesota Wild %
14 Calgary Flames %
15 New York Rangers %
16 Florida Panthers %
17 Atlanta Thrashers %
18 Vancouver Canucks %
19 Columbus Blue Jackets %
20 Buffalo Sabres %
Hockey
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within 20 [5] wins 
of being correct?
In this section, you will estimate the number of wins that National Hockey League hockey teams 
have as of April 6, 2001. You should try to be accurate within 20 [5] wins of the truth. These 10 
teams were selected at random from the 30 teams in the league. Within the 20 teams in this packet, 
the average number of wins is 34 and 90% of the teams fall between 24 and 46.
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University of Michigan Knowledge Quiz (harder criteria in brackets) 
1 Asian American freshman %
2 freshman applicants accepted %
3 freshman with a 4.0 high school GPA %
4 freshman who drop-out %
5 undergraduates who enroll in graduate school %
6 out-of-state students %
7 graduates students %
8 freshmen who live in residence hall %
9 undergraduates who enter the Greek System %
10 undergraduates enrolled in LS&A %
11 accepted freshman applicants who enroll %
12 Caucasian freshman %
13 graduates who are employed within 9 months %
14 minority undergraduates %
15 freshmen who receive AP/IB credits %
16 students with a 3.9 high school GPA or higher %
17 of transfer applicants, those accepted %
18 %
19 %
20 students who graduate within five years %
freshmen applicants who score in the middle 
50th percentile range on the SATs
undergraduates enrolled in the School of 
Engineering
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within ± 15 [5] 
percentage points of being 
correct?
In this section, you will estimate the percent of University of Michigan students who are in a 
particular category as of Fall 2003. You should try to be accurate within ± 15 [5] percentage points 
of the truth. Within the 20 categories in this packet, the average percent of students is 46% and 90% 
of the percents fall between 17 and 84.
What percent of UM students are in each category?
 University of Michigan Student Demographics
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1 Angell Hall to Stockwell Hall %
2 Graduate Library to West Quad %
3 Baits to Markley Hall %
4 Stockwell Hall to Michigan Union %
5 Yost Arena to Michigan Theatre %
6 Ulrich’s Bookstore to Media Union %
7 Michigan Book & Supply to Business School %
8 Media Union to Stadium %
9 East Hall to Espresso Royale %
10 Michigan Theatre to Chemistry Building %
11 Angell Hall to Bursley %
12 Angell Hall to Michigan League %
13 Bursley Hall to Michigan League %
14 Graduate Library to University Hospital %
15 Lane Hall to University Hospital %
16 Michigan Union to Undergraduate Library %
17 East Quad to Michigan Book & Supply %
18 Michigan Theatre to Undergrad Library %
19 Bschool to Yost Arena %
20 East Hall to Michigan Theatre %
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within ± .5 [.2] of a 
mile of being correct?
In this section, you will estimate the distances (in tenths of miles) between University of Michigan 
points of interest. You should try to be accurate within ± .5 (five-tenths) [.2] of a mile of the 
truth. Within the 20 distances in this packet, the average distance between points is 1 mile and 90% 
of the distances fall between .5 and 2.6 miles.
What is the distance (in tenths of miles) between each of 
these two points?
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How many points did the team score in this game?
1 Michigan's points against Central Michigan %
2 Michigan's points against Notre Dame %
3 Oregon's points against Michigan %
4 Michigan's points against Indiana %
5 Michigan's points against Minnesota %
6 Illinois's points against Michigan %
7 Michigan's points against Purdue %
8 Michigan State's points against Michigan %
9 Ohio State's points against Michigan %
10 Michigan's points against Southern California %
11 Central Michigan's points against Michigan %
12 Michigan's points against Houston %
13 Indiana's points against Michigan %
14 Michigan's points against Iowa %
15 Minnesota's points against Michigan %
16 Michigan's points against Illinois %
17 Purdue's points against Michigan %
18 Northwestern's points against Michigan %
19 Michigan's points against Ohio State %
20 Southern California's points against Michigan %
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within ± 10 [3] 
points of being correct?
In this section, you will estimate the number of points scored by either Michigan or their opponent 
during the 2003-2004 football season. You should try to be accurate within ± 10 [3] points of the 
truth. Within the 20 games included in this packet, the average points of teams is 28 and 90% of the 
scores fall between 10 and 45.
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What percent of M300 students are in each 
category?
1 one of their favorite tv shows is reality tv? %
2 one of their favorite tv shows is The OC? %
3 come from outside the US? %
4 major in Communications? %
5 major in Industrial & Operations Engineering? %
6 are in LS&A? %
7 are in Undergraduate Engineering? %
8 are seniors? %
9 have missed no M300 classes this semester? %
10 %
11 one of their favorite tv shows is The Family Guy? %
12 one of their favorite tv shows is Sex and the City? %
13 one of their favorite tv shows pertained to sports? %
14 one of their favorite tv shows is Friends? %
15 come from someplace in Michigan? %
16 major in Economics? %
17 major in Psychology? %
18 major in General Studies? %
19 missed the first day of M300? %
20 %missed more than three days of M300 this 
semester?
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within ± 15 [5] 
percentage points of being 
correct?
have missed more than half of the classes this 
semester?
In this section, you will estimate the percent of students in M300 this semester who are in a 
particular category. You should try to be accurate within ± 15 [5] percentage points of the truth. 
Within the 20 categories in this packet, the average percent of students is 25% and 90% of the 
percents fall between 8% and 54%.
M300 Students
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What is the price of this Ann Arbor delivery 
pizza?
1 Cottage Inn small cheese
2 Mr. Pizza small mushroom
3 Pizza House large cheese deep dish
4 Bell's Pizza medium sausage
5 Pizza House small Hawaiian
6 Little Caesars small vegetarian
7 New York Pizza Depot small 4 meat combo
8 Little Caesars large vegetarian
9 Dominos medium peperoni
10 New York Pizza Depot medium 4 meat combo
11 Mr. Pizza medium sausage
12 Dominos large pepperoni
13 New York Pizza Depot large 4 meat combo
14 Pizza Hut medium pepperoni and olive
15 Bell's Pizza small sausage
16 Cottage Inn large cheese
17 Pizza House medium pepperoni deep dish
18 Little Caesars medium vegetarian
19 Pizza Hut medium pepperoni
20 Pizza House large Hawaiian
How confident are you that this 
estimate is within ±$3.00 
[$1.00] of being correct?
In this section, you will estimate the price (not including delivery or tax) of delivery pizza from 
various restaurants in Ann Arbor. You should try to be accurate within ±$3.00 [$1.00] of the truth. 
Within the 20 delivery pizzas in this packet, the average price of the delivery pizza is $11.53 and 
90% of the prices fall between $6.99 and $14.80
Ann Arbor Delivery Pizza
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Appendix B  
This appendix presents the statistical conditions that underlie the relationship between 
perceived percentile, overplacement, and overconfidence. We begin with the relationship 
between perceived percentile and overconfidence. Let p´ and p represent perceived percentile 
and actual percentile, and x´ and x represent mean confidence and proportion correct. Presently, 
we are interested in the relationship between p´ and OC = x´ - x.  
The direction of this relationship is determined by the sign of the covariance. In the 
following derivation, S refers to the standard deviation of the subscripted variable and r to the 
correlation of the subscripted variables. 
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The covariance is positive if  






>   , 
and negative if  







In other words, the direction of the relationship can be determined by comparing a ratio of 
correlations to a ratio of standard deviations. 
 Thinking through the empirical results in this paper provides some insight into this result. 
When observations correspond to participants responding to a single topic and difficulty level, 
is very low (poor correlation between perceived percentile and accuracy), the ratio of 
correlations is large and greatly exceeds the ratio of standard deviations, and hence perceived 
percentile and overconfidence move together. When observations correspond to group means for 
difficult and easy versions of the same domain, the ratio of correlations is close to one (because 
perceived percentile, confidence, and proportion correct consistently move together within topic, 
so is high ) and the ratio of standard deviations is greater than one ( , reflecting the 
p xr ′
p xr ′ xS S ′> x
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fact that confidence tracks accuracy but does not keep up—see means in Tables 3 and 4). The net 
result is that the ratio of standard deviations exceeds the ratio of correlations, and so perceived 
percentile and OC move in opposite directions across levels of difficulty. Finally, when 
observations correspond to group means on topics for a constant level of the difficulty 
manipulation, is low (topics where people place themselves highly are not necessarily the 
ones on which they are most accurate), the ratio of correlations is high, and perceived percentile 
and OC move together. 
p xr ′
 When group means are considered, overplacement is simply perceived percentile minus 
50, so we can interpret the above relationships in terms of overplacement and OC moving 
together or in opposite directions. At the individual level, however, high perceived percentile is 
not necessarily a bias, because the person may truly be performing better than others. In this 
case, it is interesting to explore the relationship between overplacement (p´ - p) and 
overconfidence calculated at the individual level. Again, we start with the covariance. 
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To simplify this relationship and relate it to the results above, we will make two assumptions.  
First, we assume that , which is that the objective measures are perfectly correlated. 
Strictly speaking, this correlation will be less than one because although there is a monotonic 
relationship between actual percentile and accuracy it is nonlinear. Second, we assume that 
' . Empirically these correlations between subjective and objective measures tend to be 
reasonably similar. After applying these assumptions and performing some simple algebra, we 
find that the covariance is positive if 
1pxr =
'p x pxr r=
' '
' ' ' ' '
1p x px x
p x x p x p x
r ss s
r s s s r
⎛ ⎞
> + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 . 
Note that this equation is the same as the result above, with an additional term added to the 
righthand side. The ratio p pS S ′ is likely to be greater than one, since the numerator is the 
standard deviation of the standard uniform distribution, and it is unlikely that the subjective 
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measures are more spread out than that. When is low (i.e., there is a low correlation between 
perceived percentile and proportion correct) the lefthand side will be large and the righthand side 
will be small or negative. Consequently, overplacement and overconfidence will tend to move 
together. It is technically possible to reverse this relationship, but it requires a delicate balance of 
the relative sizes of the ratios of standard deviations and correlations, which we leave for further 
study.  
'p xr
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 Table 1 
Regression Equations Predicting Degree of Overconfidence from Perceived Percentile, 




  1 2 3 4 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Constant -20.4 -33.6 -49.1 -55.49 
Perceived percentile .35 .41 .40 .36 
Difficulty dummy  21.7 21.5 21.2 
Domain dummies   Incl. Incl. 
Participant dummies    Incl. 
Adj. R-sq .09 .23 .31 .44 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Note. All coefficients significant at p < .001.
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Table 2 
Regression Equations Predicting Degree of Overconfidence from Perceived Percentile, 




  1 2 3 4 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Constant -2.9 -16.9 -13.9 -14.8 
Perceived percentile .39 .45 .39 .46 
Difficulty dummy  22.0 21.7 21.9 
Domain dummies   Incl. Incl. 
Participant dummies    Incl. 
Adj. R-sq .08 .21 .27 .53 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  All coefficients significant at p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Mean Perceived Percentile, Under-/Overconfidence, Confidence, and Proportion Correct by 
Domain and by Difficulty (Study 1) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 Perceived Under-/Over-  Proportion  
Domain Difficulty Percentile Confidence Confidence Correct  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
University Easy 51.2 -6.0 65.8 71.7 
 Hard 41.1 13.1 36.1 23.0 
Nobel Easy 32.1 -24.9 48.0 72.0 
 Hard 21.5 .7 14.2 13.5 
Wealth Easy 33.45 -6.8 38.9 46.4 
 Hard 31.0 7.7 14.4 6.8 
Pop Easy 40.8 -13.5 48.7 62.2 
 Hard 35.7 -1.3 20.7 22.0 
NHL Easy 41.5 -33.9 62.7 96.5 
 Hard 31.4 -13.8 25.7 39.5 
Overall Mean Easy 39.8 -17.0 52.8 69.9 
 Hard 32.1 1.3 22.2 21.0 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 
Mean Perceived Percentile, Under-/Overconfidence, Confidence, and Proportion Correct by 
Domain and by Difficulty (Study 2) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 Perceived Under-/Over-  Proportion  
Domain Difficulty Percentile Confidence Confidence Correct  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Demographics Easy 57.4 10.0 57.4 55.7 
 Hard 52.5 29.7 58.2 28.6 
Campus Distances Easy 58.0 5.6 60.9 55.3 
 Hard 51.8 22.5 55.6 33.1 
Michigan Football Easy 48.6 -4.4 57.6 62.1 
 Hard 43.1 15.8 44.9 29.1 
Class Info. Easy 59.0 23.2 67.5 44.3 
 Hard 58.1 43.5 57.2 13.7 
Pizza Prices Easy 58.1 7.8 76.3 68.6 
 Hard 50.6 28.7 55.9 27.1 
Overall Mean Easy 56.3 8.5 65.7 57.2 
 Hard 51.3 28.1 54.4 26.3 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5 
Perceived Percentile and Under-/Overconfidence Correlated with Personality Measures, by 
Study. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 Study 1 (n = 40) Study 2 (n = 35) 
 ______________________ _____________________ 
Personality Perceived Under-/ Perceived Under-/ 
Measure Percentile Overconf. Percentile Overconf. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Need for Cognition -.27 -.14 .01 .03 
Need for Closure .31+ .34* .02 -.13 
Self Esteem -.23 .01 -.01 -.11 
Need for Uniqueness .05 -.07   
Hypernarcissism     .02 .15 
Defensive Pessimism     -.09 .13 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory  .01 .09 
________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Perceived percentile and under-/overconfidence are calculated at the individual level by 
averaging response across 10 subdomains. 
* = p < .05, + = p < .1, two-tailed. 
 
Social Comparison and Confidence 51 
Table 6 
Table 3 
Correlations between Perceived Percentile, Confidence, Actual Percentile, Proportion Correct, 




  Actual Proportion  Under-/Over- Under-/Over- 
Variable Confidence Percentile Correct Placement Confidence 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Study 1(n = 40) 
Perceived Percentile .649** .490** .490** .870** .565** 
Confidence  .282 .310 .587** .945** 
Actual Percentile   .917** -.003 .167 
Proportion Correct    .039 .159 
Under-/Overplacement     .556** 
Study 2(n = 35) 
Perceived Percentile .438* .332* .348* .687** .253 
Confidence  .085 .142 .350* .885** 
Actual Percentile   .971** -.457** -.375* 
Proportion Correct    -.419* -.335* 
Under-/Overplacement     .530** 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Easy Under-/Overconfidence and Hard Under-/Overplacement correlated .339 in Study 1 
and .495 in Study 2. Hard Under-/Overconfidence and Easy Under-/Overplacement correlated 
.475 in Study 1 and .194 in Study 2. 
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Table 7 
Average Correlations between Perceived Percentile and Under-/Overconfidence Calculated for 
Different Combinations of Domain and Difficulty, by Study. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Average Correlations  Study 1 Study 2 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Within subdomain (n = 10) .41 .31 
Within domain and across difficulty (n = 10) .41 .22 
Across domain and within difficulty (n = 40) .25 .06 
Across domain and difficulty (n = 40) .22 .08 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Note. n is the number of correlations that are used to calculate the averages. Correlations were r-
to-z transformed before averaging and then converted back. Significance tests were performed on 
the transformed values. 
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Table 8 
Average Correlations between Under-/Overplacement and Under-/Overconfidence Controlling 
for Self-Schema Calculated for Different Combinations of Domain and Difficulty, by Study. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Average Correlations  Study 1 Study 2 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Within subdomain (n = 10) .57 .70 
Within domain and across difficulty (n = 10) .22 .26 
Across domain and within difficulty (n = 40) .13 .07 
Across domain and difficulty (n = 40) .14 .09 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Note.  n is the number of correlations that are used to calculate the averages. Correlations were r-
to-z transformed before averaging and then converted back. Significance tests were performed on 
the transformed values. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The weak relationship between confidence and proportion correct in the 
overconfidence litereature 
Figure 2. The weak relationship between perceived percentile and actual percentile in the better-
than-average literature. 
Figure 3. Three hypothesized relationships with perceived percentile: A strong relationship 
between perceived percentile and confidence (top panel); a weak relationship between perceived 
percentile and proportion correct (top panel); and a strong relationsihp between perceived 
percentile and overconfidence (bottom panel).  
Figure 4. Hypothesized relationship between perceived percentile and proportion correct (top 
panel), confidence (top panel), and overconfidence (bottom panel) as task difficulty varies.  
Figure 5. Hypothesized reversal between perceived percentile and overconfidence as task 
difficulty varies within a domain: Easy tasks yield higher perceived percentiles and less 
overconfidence.  
Figure 6. Regressions of confidence, proportion correct, and overconfidence on perceived 
percentile (Study 1).  
Figure 7. Regressions of confidence, proportion correct, and overconfidence on perceived 
percentile (Study 2). 
Figure 8. A plot of the ten domain level averages for overconfidence and perceived percentile 
ignoring the difficulty manipulation (top panel, with regression line) and including the difficulty 
manipulation (bottom panel—measures from the same domain are connected by a line). 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 6 
 
Conf = 13.33 + .67 * Percentile




















































































































































OC = -2.85 + .39 * Percentile 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 The hard-easy effect in overconfidence is inevitable for some methods of sorting questions into 
hard and easy categories (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Juslin et al., 2000; 
Klayman et al., 1999). Part of the problem is that the independent variable (accuracy) and 
dependent variable (overconfidence  = confidence – accuracy) are bound to be correlated 
because the same measure of accuracy shows up in both halves of the equation. Error in the 
accuracy measure guarantees the effect (see Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin et al., 2000; Klayman 
et al., 1999). Some versions of the hard-easy effect hold up to statistical control. For example, 
individuals who are less accurate on one set of questions (i.e., the questions are hard for them) 
are more overconfident on a different set of questions on the same topic (Klayman et al., 1999). 
2It is worth noting that the “hard-easy” effect depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 2 differs 
from that traditionally discussed in the overconfidence literature because average proportion 
correct is manipulated for a whole population in an ability domain. Thus, the hard-easy effect on 
percentiles is manifested as an increase in perceived percentile (i.e., the line in the bottom panel 
of Figure 2 shifts upward). Kruger and Dunning (1999) conducted an analysis of percentile 
estimates that more directly parallels the original hard-easy analysis in the overconfidence 
literature (see Footnote 1) when they sorted participants based on their actual percentile and 
examined their percentile estimates. They found that the worst performers (as measured by actual 
percentile) overestimated their percentile, whereas the best performers underestimated theirs. In 
a direct parallel to the overconfidence literature, this pattern has been reinterpreted as a necessary 
effect of regression (Ackerman et al., 2002; Burson et al., in press; Krueger & Mueller, 2002). 
3 Mean differences in the correlations were tested after performing an r-to-z transformation on 
the individual correlations, taking an average, and then performing a set of planned, non-
orthogonal contrasts (df = 96) on the means of the transformed correlations. The contrasts 
compared Row 1 vs. Row 2, and Row 2 vs. Rows 3 and 4. 
